The Belgian Barrier Model

Belgium’s barrier model explores opportunities, signals, facilitators, partners, and barriers to step up vehicle crime prevention. It promotes collaboration between the public and private sectors, emphasising the need for an international approach and fostering trust between the different stakeholders.

Click the “+” symbol for more information on each step. Explore the detailed insights in our report to learn more about the barrier model.

  1. Open borders;
  2. No roaming tariffs in the EU;
  3. Low cost travel to Belgium;
  4. Limited ANPR camera systems and old ANPR at borders;
  5. Easy car rental at entry points;
  6. Cheap busses to BE from EU;
  7. Knowledge of ANPR locations;
  8. Pick-up by associates;
  9. ANPR system easily evaded;
  10. Distrust between LEA (EU) and LEA and private sector;
  11. Lack of resources for intervention teams (LEA);
  12. VPN & encryption apps
  1. Complete visual picture;
  2. Prior convictions during control or Smart cameras;
  3. Information of foreign LEAs;
  4. Known vehicles;
  5. Specific known every points;
  6. Multiple license plates;
  7. LED-lights/magnets on license plates
  1. Public transport;
  2. Flix busses;
  3. Airports;
  4. Telecom companies;
  5. Car manufacturers;
  6. Criminal networks;
  7. Online shops
  1. ANPR;
  2. Customs;
  3. Border police;
  4. Law enforcement in general;
  5. Telecom companies;
  6. Shared databases/cross road banks;
  7. Europol/foreign LEA;
  8. Car rental companies;
  9. Car manufacturers
  1. Bordertask/ Frontex;
  2. LEA training;
  3. LEA control;
  4. Information sharing between different partners;
  5. Legislation/regulation EU;
  6. ANPR network expansion (EUCARIS);
  7. Better tracking of car data/license plates in general;
  8. Lighthouse project;
  9. Data sharing between different partners;
  10. Creating trust between LEA
  1. Anonymous & cheap stays are easy and accessible;
  2. Cash transactions are still accepted;
  3. Registration of temporary residents/tourist within country by hotels, Airbnb’s and campings is limited;
  4. Community officers are under-resourced;
  5. Signals can be picked-up but the notification seems useless to private partners
  1. Physical signs;
  2. Frequency/duration of stay;
  3. Hot sports
  1. Criminal network;
  2. Hotels;
  3. Airbnb;
  4. Family;
  5. Camping
  1. Hotels;
  2. Community officer;
  3. LEA in general;
  4. Mayor;
  5. Municipality;
  6. Airbnb;
  7. Public prosecutor/attorney general
  1. Control of registration within municipality;
  2. Legislation/regulation/Policy;
  3. Rental Check App;
  4. Awareness campaigns for accommodation employees/staff;
  5. Clear point of contact LEA
  1. LEA control is limited;
  2. Patrol teams have no access to specialised databases;
  3. Easy/ no control for car rental;
  4. Easy/ fast movement within country & broad network of alternative;
  5. Overcrowding of traffic on roads;
  6. Multiple ports/ easy access;
  7. Multiple spots where a large amount of cars are grouped together;
  8. ANPR limitations;
  9. Open borders;
  10. ANPR does not recognise certain license plates;
  11. EU roaming/VPN/encrypted apps;
  12. Anonymous use of public transport.
  1. Foreign license plates/ stolen license plates;
  2. ANPR notifications;
  3. Suspicious behaviour around large parking lots.
  1. Criminal network;
  2. Car rental/leasing companies;
  3. ICT – encryption apps and VPN services;
  4. Public transport.
  1. Law Enforcement Agencies;
  2. LEA training/education facilities;
  3. ANPR;
  4. Car rental companies;
  5. Port terminals;
  6. Parking garages;
  7. Telecom companies;
  8. Municipality;
  9. Privately operating cameras;
  10. FOD mobility- DIV/crossroads bank;
  11. Assuralia;
  12. Public transport.
  1. Patrolling teams in hotspots;
  2. Education/training of police;
  3. Rental Check App;
  4. Legislation/regulation concerning rental companies;
  5. Awareness campaigns of car rental companies, parking attendants and civilians;
  6. Car parks storage of data and information in databases/ public parking attendants;
  7. Crossroads Bank for vehicles;
  8. Firehouse project.
  1. Easy access to lock-picking devices and other ICT tools
  2. Universal/general tools which can be shared within networks
  3. Limited control of law enforcement
  4. Easy tracking of desired cars
  5. Availability of cars/ places with a large amount of cars
  6. Easy use and youtube tutorials on ICT tools
  7. Jammers (track and trace) are easily accessible
  8. Use of family car
  9. Easy access to blank car key fobs (online orders or in dealerships)
  10. Knowledge and know-how sharing in prison
  11. Availability of luxury cars
  12. Open borders/fast movement to other EU countries
  13. Mutual assistance request from LEA provide a safe time window
  14. Distrust between different LEA and between private sector and LEA
  15. GDPR regulation policy is not coherent in EU
  16. Access to VPN & encryption apps
  17. Easy money laundering through vehicle fraud
  18. No priority for car fraud in prosecutor’s office
  19. Long duration of crime investigations (LEA and prosecutor’s office)
  20. No enforcement of duty to report at vehicle inspection services
  21. Mileage fraud is easy with older imported cars
  22. Manufacturers are afraid of image damage so no open communication in anti-theft prevention
  23. ICT/ white hat hackers are not always appreciated by car manufacturers
  24. Use of standardised cryptography by car manufacturers
  25. Key codes are not varied enough/ randomly generated
  26. Car manufacturers have not enough technical/ ICT knowledge to implement safe systems/ fast updates
  27. All-Keys-Are-Lost system easily abused
  28. Car manufacturers are slow to implement changes in ICT technology once identified
  29. Car dealerships can be used (unconciously) to provide valid keys
  30. Discounts at car dealerships (insured for full price) provide easy profit
  31. ICT keeps changing, no easy long term solutions to prevent ICT related theft
  32. Dark web will always provide access to tools (even if they are prohibited)
  33. Electrical diagram of vehicles are online accessible
  1. Location, time and space principle
  2. Physical characteristics
  3. Previous criminal activity/ criminal record
  4. Known locations
  5. Car accidents in remote locations and foreign vehicles
  6. Car accidents on busy parking lots (supermarkets;..) with one foreign vehicle
  1. Car manufacturers
  2. ICT- developers / sellers
  3. Internet
  4. Forgers
  5. Malicious car dealerships
  6. Criminal networks
  7. Malicious auto repair shops
  8. Malicious car towing companies
  9. Dark web
  10. Insurance companies (insuring the discount)
  1. ICT-developers and retailers
  2. Car manufacturers
  3. Internet shops
  4. Customs
  5. Policy makers
  6. ANPR
  7. Civillians
  8. Insurance companies
  9. Public prosecutor office
  10. Media
  11. Car dealerships
  12. Auto repair shops
  13. Car towing companies
  14. Prisons
  15. LEA
  16. Postal service
  17. Insurance Europe
  18. Vehicle Crime Investigators Association (VCI)
  19. European Union/ Europol/Frontex
  20. Federal department of mobility / car registration agency (DIV)
  21. Vehicle Inspection services
  22. Car Pass/ Traxio/Febiac
  1. Legislation & regulation
  2. LEA training
  3. LEA patrols
  4. EU cooperation
  5. Media sensibilisation of civilians
  6. ANPR expansion
  7. Anti-theft measures by car manufacturers
  8. Pro-active ICT development and cooperation with private sector
  9. Pro-active and repressive cooperation between insurance companies and LEA
  10. Theft/fraud detection within insurance industry
  11. LEA and private sector cooperation (detection/investigation)
  12. Comprehensive EU database based on VIN
  13. Firehouse initiative
  14. Car Pass initiative
  15. Two factor authentication systems in cars
  16. Consultancy of white hat hackers by car manufacturers and LEA
  17. Bounty programs for white hat hackers by car manufacturers
  18. No insurance of discount amount by insurance companies
  19. Fast and easy access to black box information/car data for LEA and car insurance companies after theft/accidents/fraud
  20. Fast updates for ICT technology by car manufacturers
  21. More prioritising of car fraud within prosecutor’s office/ LEA
  22. More resources for national car registration agency
  23. Better use of cryptography within cars and keys (non-standardised)
  24. More restriction/better protocols of the all-keys-are-lost-system
  25. Introducing the distance bonding protocol (against relay/replay attacks)
  26. Promoting anti-theft measures by all private partners (insurance companies/car manufacturers)
  27. Enforcing the duty to report by vehicle inspection services
  1. Easy & anonymous subletting of storage facilities (legal market)
  2. Easy access and general vacancy of firms and storage facilities
  3. Large amount of car parks
  4. Anonymity of parking at Airbnb/hotels
  5. Subletting/rental of (malicious) car repair shops
  6. Large network of malicious second hand car dealerships
  7. Availability of parking spots/lots near highways
  8. Cash transactions are welcomed in storage facilities and garage boxes
  1. Cars overnight at car parks/open parking spaces/ beside the road/
  2. Communication within network increases
  3. Activity at car repair shops at odd hours
  4. Activity at car dealerships at odd hours
  5. Odd rental requests
  6. Luxury cars unattended at public parking spaces at night
  7. Parking attendants can identify wrongly parked cars/overdue parking
  8. Multiple parking tickets on a car
  9. Cars that haven’t moved in a while based on the physical appearance
  1. Subletters of storage facilities
  2. Criminal network/ Straw men (renting of spaces)
  3. Aware or unaware owners of legitimate firms/storage facilities
  4. Malicious second hand car dealerships
  5. (Malicious) car repair shops
  6. Criminal network
  1. Car parks
  2. Unaware owners of films/storage facilities
  3. LEA
  4. Community officer
  5. Civillians
  6. Community parking/private parking attendants
  7. Federal or local inspection services in social law
  1. ICT/ Camera surveillance in car parks
  2. Awareness campaigns for rental companies, parking attendants and civilians
  3. RentCheck App
  4. ICT technology and access to mobile data
  5. National regulation
  6. Parking attendants scan license plates/valuable data
  7. LEA more control, experience and motivation to check abnormal signals
  8. More Federal or local inspection in social law infringements
  9. Frequent operational meetings/ information sharing between LEAs and other inspection
  1. Trucks on highways that block the ANPR
  2. Track and Trace jammers easily available
  3. Expedition offices/shipping companies lack of documentation checks
  4. Cash transactions in expedition offices
  5. Limited control of RORO and containers at ports
  6. Legal business as a front for malicious activity
  7. Limited trust and contact between private partners and LEA
  8. Easy access and fast switching between license plates
  9. Limited reporting by vehicle inspection services
  10. Cheap and easy outsourcing of transport (by road) to unconcious parties
  11. Large value of car parts
  12. Easy to forge documents (online access to blank formats)
  13. Cheap access to total loss cars/insurance fraud to clone valid identity
  14. Open borders
  15. Taking advantage of the legal car trade circuits
  16. Easy access (anonymous) to secondhand online platforms
  17. Taking advantage of uneducated/naive civilians
  18. Mandatory Car Pass only in Belgium
  19. Large criminal network/resources for trade
  20. Access to multiple ports (BE and EU)
  21. Pseudo-self employment within car dealership business
  22. Easy access and use of encrypted Apps/VPN
  23. Long investigations by LEA, no priority at prosecutor’s office/policy makers
  24. Low recuperation rate for LEA and insurance companies
  25. Not enough resources for customs, car registration agencies and vehicle inspection services to check
  26. No information for second hand dealers with regard to loans/leases on cars
  27. Car Pass is not coherently checked by dealers
  28. Cooperation within the private sector is limited
  29. Cars and car parts are not illegal goods – no specific checks by shipping companies/postal services
  30. No obligation to provide information within shipping companies/postal services
  31. No coherent EU policy on minimum of data gathering for private sector (insurance companies, car dealerships, postal services, manufacturers,..) and government (LEA, vehicle registration agencies, vehicle inspection services,..)
  32. Car Pass can be used to validate false information (first inspection after 4 years, imported cars)
  33. No coherent EU policy on cash transactions within car sector
  1. Physical characteristics
  2. Patterns with registration at expedition offices
  3. False documentation/ identification at customs
  4. ANPR notifications
  5. False documentation at vehicle inspection services
  6. Refurbished cars (wrong VIN) at vehicle inspection services
  7. Refusal of digital/traceable transactions (only cash)
  8. Multiple license plates/documentation of different cars/ID’s in vehicle
  9. Cheap parts/cars on online platforms
  10. ID’s & documentation of different cars on phone
  11. Vehicles stacked in container without care
  12. Truck drivers requested to appear at night in abandoned places
  1. Expedition offices around ports / shipping companies
  2. Truck drivers (aware and unaware)
  3. Online shops/dealers
  4. Scrap yards
  5. Malicious second hand car dealerships
  6. Criminal network/ fencers
  1. Customs
  2. Expedition offices
  3. LEA
  4. Websites and online second hand platforms
  5. Policy makers
  6. Insurance companies
  7. Vehicle inspection services
  8. Export/shipping/postal companies
  9. Scrap yards
  10. Civilians
  11. Truck drivers/associations
  12. Port terminals
  13. Prosecutors
  14. Inspection authorities in social law
  15. Car manufacturers
  16. National car registration agency
  17. PARSEC EU initiative
  1. LEA resources and training
  2. Legislation/regulation with regard to online markets of ICT tools
  3. Custom agencies resources and training
  4. ANPR expansion and improvement
  5. Awareness campaigns for civilians and private sector
  6. Legislation/regulation of expedition offices
  7. Banning cash transactions within the private sector
  8. Checks on legal market and creation of a verification system
  9. Expanding Car Pass in EU (EU legislation) with EUCARIS network
  10. Information sharing between LEA in EU and international
  11. Better/faster intervention on websites that provide blank documentation formats/fake license plates
  12. Registry for scrap yards and mandatory documentation checks
  13. Tracking criminal networks/investigating data and communication
  14. More control of social penal law within second-hand car dealerships/car repair shops
  15. Effective prosecution of fencers
  16. Screening of shipping companies
  17. Awareness campaigns for partners in Eastern Europe/cooperation
  18. Legentics network can be used to track stolen cars
  19. Dotting of car parts (authenticating parts)
  20. EU database for national vehicle registration agencies
  21. EU regulation on car manufacturers (sharing of vehicle data with LEA and private sector)
  22. More resources and mandatory duty-to-report for vehicle inspection services
  23. PARSEC initiative collaboration
  24. Creating a database based on car information (history, leases, insurance, registration, track and trace, theft, fraud, mileage) between LEA and private sector
  25. EU-regulation of minimum required verified information/data collection of postal services
  26. Expanding the Car Pass initiative to contain more information
  27. Awareness campaigns for second-hand car dealerships by TRAXIO concerning theft/fraud
  28. Access for TRAXIO/FEBIAC to the stolen car (VIN) list
  1. Limited checks and balances in second-hand markets abroad
  2. Great demand in Eastern Europe and Africa
  3. Bartering of cars in exchange for weapons and drugs
  4. Money laundering opportunities
  5. Wars and conflict around the globe
  6. Multiple phones to conduct business without data tracking
  7. Payments in cash for family and friends’ needs
  8. Access to anonymous transactions with cryptocurrencies
  9. Large amounts of cash allowed on planes
  10. Easy access to RAWBANK-credit cards
  11. Places friendly to large amounts of cash
  12. Easy access to money/cash transfer companies
  13. No coherent EU policy on cash transactions (maximum cash payment in car dealerships)
  1. Living standards in comparison to official employment
  2. Multiple phones (No 4G, only WIFI with VPN)
  3. Multiple bank transfers
  4. Multiple accounts with limited amounts
  5. Frequent cash deposits
  6. Money laundering notifications in the bank (Risk assessment)
  1. Second-hand car dealerships abroad
  2. Criminal networks
  3. Terrorists
  4. Family and friends
  5. Money transfer services (Western Union/MoneyGram)
  6. Cryptocurrency
  1. Government agencies (finance)
  2. Financial institutions
  3. Legislators
  4. Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA)
  1. Tracking of money trails (repressive)
  2. Risk factor analysis by financial institutions
  3. Legislation/regulation
  4. LEA training
  5. More control on cash in airports
  6. EU policy on cash transactions (limit on cash exchange in general and for cars)